Part 2

Regional Identity and Challenges

The Asia-Pacific Community:
Myth or Reality?

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Since the 1980s, as the term "globalization" has itself gained global currency, the economic, social, and cultural processes to which it refers have acquired an aura of ubiquity and inevitability. This is neither incidental nor unprecedented. Like modernization theory, which it has gradually superseded, the discourse on globalization frequently lays claim to a totalizing universality.[1] Yet, even as apologists forecast a borderless, integrated global economy built upon rational policies promoting economic and political liberalization through deregulation and privatization, globalization has also spawned a derivative discourse challenging this claim to universality. Animated by what Arif Dirlik calls *"place-based imagination,"* this derivative discourse has drawn new attention to the particular, through the lens of localism

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[1] We must remember, however, that "globalization" remains a highly contested concept, subject to different meanings and usages. This fact is neatly captured in Richard Higgott's twofold definition of globalization as: "(i) "the emergence of a set of sequences and processes increasingly less hindered by territorial or jurisdictional barriers and one that enhances the spread of trans-border practices in economic, political, cultural and social domains; and (ii) as a discourse of political knowledge offering one view—perhaps the dominant one among powerful decision making elite—of how to make the postmodern world manageable. For many, globalization as knowledge constitutes a rationalization of government that challenges the language and imagery of a state-centric world and defines the limits of the possible." Richard Higgott, "The Political Economy of Globalisation in East Asia: the Salience of 'Region Building,'" in Kris Olds, Peter Dicken, Philip F. Kelly, Lily Kong and Henry Wai-chung Yeung, eds., *Globalization and the Asia-Pacific: Contested Territories* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 92.

and regionalism. While not necessarily opposed to globalization, per se, it seeks to create new regional communities, or new networks of local communities, in order to resist globalization's threat of marginalization and to fashion new political spaces in which to influence the process of development and its outcomes.[2]

Asia has certainly not been immune to discourses on regionalism, which have a history there even longer than that of globalization. In this context, it is pertinent to recall that as early as 1936(??) Imperial Japan cited the need to create a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in order to justify its prosecution of the Pacific War. For one thing, this example serves to remind us that places are not preordained; they are produced, together with the networks of social relations that help to define their inhabitants. For another, it helps to account for the ambiguity that has greeted Japanese proponents of a new Asia-Pacific regionalism since the early 1980s, when Japan began to embrace this strategy as a means to cope with the forces of globalization. That is, citizens in some of the countries that Japan hopes to join within a new Asia-Pacific regional partnership are wary of doing so, vividly recalling the wartime hardships they experienced as a result of Japan's earlier promise of "co-prosperity."[3]

However, wartime memories are not the only, or even the major, impediment to the construction of a viable Asia-Pacific regional community. Another factor often cited by skeptics is the dearth of historical and cultural ties upon which to forge such a community, especially when contrasted with the likes of Europe and the EU or North America and NAFTA. While both of these alliances clearly represent marriages of economic convenience, their success is allegedly bol-

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2 Arif Dirlik, "Globalism and the Politics of Place," in Ibid.

3 Yumei Zhang, *Pacific Asia: The Politics of Development* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 139-140. Memories of the war and the Japanese occupation forces in East and Southeast Asia continue to evolve in response to domestic politics; they vary not only between countries, but also between ethnic groups within a single society. See Wang Gungwu, "Memories of War: World War II in Asia," in P. Lim Pui Huen and Diana Wong, eds., *War and Memory in Malaysia and Singapore* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000); and Ricardo T. Jose, "War and Violence, History and Memory," in Kwok Kian-Woon, Indira Arumugam, Karen Chia and Lee Chee Keng, eds., *'We Asians': Between Past and Future* (Singapore: National Heritage Society, 2000).

stered by the existence of contiguous political borders, shared histories and cultures, and shared languages.'The Asia-Pacific, on the other hand, is potentially so vast geographically, and so diverse culturally, as to deny any hint of commonality and any basis for community. If taken literally to mean all states bordering the Pacific Ocean, then one is obliged to include portions of Central and South America, not to mention North America, together with Australia, New Zealand, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. Even if the Americas are excluded, one is still left with a region whose ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity, coupled with vastly different stages of economic and political development, continue to challenge the communal integrity of certain postcolonial member states, such as Indonesia and Malaysia.

This fact has prompted some proponents of regionalism to seek alternatives to the Asia-Pacific imaginary, more akin to the imagined integrity of the Western European and North American models. Yet, the alternatives most often mentioned—Southeast Asia and East Asia—each present their own problems. Like the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the name Southeast Asia dates from the Pacific War; invented by the Allied Forces to coordinate their counter-offensive military operations against Japan. At the time, only Thailand (Siam) bore any semblance of a sovereign nation state; the other nine countries that make up today's Southeast Asia had yet to free themselves from European and American colonialism. This process of post-colonial nation building is not only recent, but arguably, remains unfinished; a circumstance that has tended to limit their governments' commitment to regional cooperation and integration.

By contrast, East Asia boasts three of the oldest state-governed societies in Asia (China, Korea, Japan), which together forged a dis-

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4 That the EU and NAFTA are also contested political inventions is clear from the disagreements that arose during the recent European Union constitutional convention in Brussels. According to one commentator, the new European constitution "is unlikely to define Europe categorically because it can't possibly reconcile the very real political, economic, and geographical divisions that exist among member countries," and because "its [the EU's] institutions remain distant, physically and metaphorically, from the people they represent." See Margalit Edelman, "E Who? The Elusive EU Identity," in The Christian Science Monitor, June 10, 2003.

tinct regional identity as a result of extensive economic and cultural ties dating back centuries. However, those ties were severed during the modern era by the forces of imperialism, colonialism, and wars both "hot" and "cold"; forces which also created deep political divisions within China and Korea that continue to threaten the security of the entire region.

These constraints have not prevented attempts by different conglomerations of state governments within the Asia-Pacific to meet the challenge of globalization by constructing regional alliances, but they have influenced the outcomes of those experiments. As Higgott explains: "... *regionness varies by policy issue and by what the dominant actors in a given group of countries, at a given time, see as their priorities. Shared historical, linguistic and/or cultural characteristics traditionally define a region, but with the attempts to construct understandings of region around the Pacific Ocean, these factors have lost some salience. While there may be structural incentives to regional cooperation (proximity, dramatic technological and economic growth and enhanced interaction flowing from it) regions are socially constructed—they need positive social and political action to advance them.*"

Again, one can even cite precedents that predate the current era of globalization. The best known is probably ASEAN, which was established in 1967 when its founding members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand) signed the Bangkok Declaration. Although this document spoke of promoting economic, social and cultural cooperation in the region, the organization was established mainly for political-security regions, which helps to explain why it has been dominated by foreign ministers and has relied on state-to-state cooperation through diplomacy.[6] With the end of the Cold War, the ASEAN policy agenda has expanded beyond traditional security issues to include trade and finance.[7] However, the Asian Financial

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5   Higgott, p. 93.

6   Jusuf Wanandi, "ASEAN's Past and the Challenges Ahead: Aspects of Politics and Security,"in Simon S.C. Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao, and Hadi Soesastro, eds., *Reinventing ASEAN* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), p. 25.

Crisis precipitated a crisis of confidence in the future of ASEAN itself, not only with respect to its policy priorities, but also with respect to its traditional code of conduct, known as the "ASEAN way."[8] Thus, it remains to be seen whether ASEAN is prepared to consider more politically sensitive issues, as well, such as democracy, human rights, poverty, literacy, and environmental pollution.

Why should economic issues dominate the agendas of so many private sector and public sector regional forums in this part of the world? There are several reasons. First, the contemporary discourse on globalization has always centered on economic reform as the basis or starting point for broader political and social reforms.[9] Economic deregulation, privatization—both within and across national borders—is seen as the catalyst for greater economic opportunity and healthy competition; which, in turn, expands the middle class; which, in turn, brings pressure from below for political deregulation at the top, culminating in the global spread of political, economic and social democracy.

Second, it is the vested political and business elites who thus have the most to gain by trying to manage, if not control, this far-reaching process. Ever since the Meiji government coined the phrase *"rich country, strong military,"* governments throughout Asia have pinned their nation-building plans, and their own legitimacy, on economic modernization. Besides funding a "strong military"—as much to quell dissent at home as to defend the homeland from foreign powers or to project its power abroad—a "rich country" may also bolster a regime's popular support, to the extent that citizens believe that their

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7   Zhang, pp. 138-143. This began in 1992 when the six original member states set up the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and gained further momentum following the 1997 Asian financial crisis through the so-called "ASEAN+3" formula, which brought the ASEAN member states (now numbering ten) together with China, Japan and South Korea. See also Higgott, p. 104.

8   The ASEAN way, among other things, "(1) emphasizes the norm of non-interference in other states' affairs; (2) prefers consensus and non-binding plans to treaties and legalistic rules; and (3) relies on national institutions and actions, rather than creating a strong central bureaucracy." Simon S.C. Tay and Jesus Estanislao, "The Relevance of ASEAN: Crisis and Change," in Tay et. al., *Reinventing ASEAN*, p. 9.

9   Robert W. Cox, "A Perspective on Globalization," in James H. Mittelman, ed., *Globalization: Critical Reflections* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 21-24.

own lives will improve as a result. Again, beginning with the Meiji leadership, those same governments have tried to discourage citizens' demands for a greater share of political power by substituting hopes for a higher standard of living, and by promoting an ideology of economic nationalism.[10]

A third reason why economic issues have spurred Asia-Pacific states to experiment with newer regional forums, like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) and its East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), is that they can be discursively framed as matters of a diplomatic, bureaucratic or technocratic nature, requiring the authority and expertise of the ruling elites in order to resolve. This reduces the possibility of public "interference" in the negotiation and policy-making process, and also reduces the potential for these economic matters to assume domestic political, social, or cultural importance beyond the ability of the elites to fully control.

What has resulted from this elite domination of the discourse on regionalism among Asia-Pacific states? First, it has meant that elite interests have dominated the "official" regional agenda. Second, it has meant that these elites have structured regional alliances so as to retain control over the policy-making process, and to favor policies that protect their interests. In practical terms, this has meant that issues impacting the quality of life of the general populations in these states—including "sustainable development," environmental pollution, economic inequality, and human rights—are either deliberately or inadvertently overlooked.

This does not mean that the ruling elites have been oblivious to public opinion. On the contrary, the political leaders of states like Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Japan have, at different times, sought to expose their citizens to selected excerpts of the twin discourses on globalization and regionalism. However, the operative phrase here is "selected excerpts", by emphasizing their own position on these matters, these leaders have worked to subsume globalization

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10 Zhang, p. 144.

and regionalism under their domestic political agenda. Under this formula, the value of globalization and regionalism is assessed almost exclusively in terms of the nation-state.

Little wonder, then, that their cautious attempts at regional co-operation through such entities as ASEAN and APEC have rarely been accompanied by genuine attempts at regional identity formation. Rather, identity remains firmly tied to the nation. A case in point is the appeal to "Asian values" that was popularized by political and business elites in countries like Malaysia, Singaporean, Korea, and Japan beginning in the late 1970s. While it may be seen as a region-wide reaction to globalization, it did not constitute a coordinated pursuit of a shared regional identity. To begin with, there was no common agreement about what values were "Asian," or even why they were uniquely Asian. The tendency during this period to affix the "Asian" label to values such as harmony, cooperation, consensus, placing society above self, and respect for authority had less to do with reviving a neglected regional heritage than with inventing a national one. In Malaysia and Singapore, the primary goal was to neutralize ethnic tensions between Malays, Chinese, and Indians within their respective societies, while in Korea and Japan it was to neutralize political tensions pitting leftists against conservatives, economic tensions pitting labor against management, and generational tensions pitting youth against their parents. Again, it must be emphasized that these goals were defined by the ruling elites, and primarily reflect the interests of these elites.[11]

Further proof that the Asian values debate was driven primarily by domestic political considerations on the part of the ruling elites is that by the early 1990s the debate itself was being quietly shelved. During this period, further advances in globalization ren-

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11 Zhang, pp. 146-147; C.J.W.-L. Wee, "From Universal to Local Culture: The State, Ethnic Identity, and Capitalism in Singapore," in C.J.W.-L. Wee, ed., *Local Cultures and the "New Asia": The State, Culture, and Capitalism in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pp. 138-142; Chua Beng Huat, "Living with Capitalism in Asia, Uncomfortably," in Kwok, et. al., *'We Asians': Between Past and Future*, pp. 141-145; David Birch, Tony Schirato, and Sanjay Srivastava, *Asia: Cultural Politics in the Global Age* (Crows Nest, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2001), pp. 14-24.

dered the political virtue of Asian values into something of a political vice. Asian values were fine, unless they ended up stifling competition, discouraging the acquisition of foreign languages and a cosmopolitan outlook, or public receptivity to foreign investment, foreign culture, and modern technology.[12] Furthermore, the 1997 Asian financial crisis revealed numerous examples of corporate and political corruption in high places, which contradicted the ethical pretensions of the very elites who had championed the Asians values doctrine.

So what, then, are the prospects for regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, especially the formation of a regional identity and sense of community? Will "Asian values" and the "Asia-Pacific" remain captive to state interests, as defined by the political and economic gentry? Addressing the crisis of confidence in the future relevance of ASEAN, Tay and Estanislao urge the political elites themselves to take the initiative.

Accordingly, the ASEAN governments must be willing to recognize the rising voice and influence of civil society and non-government organizations. The greater participation of the peoples of the region is critical to building a sense of community within the region. Where ASEAN has traditionally been a state-centric organization, in the future much greater room should be provided to allow civil society organizations within ASEAN to reach out towards each other and co-operate more intensely in the pursuit of common interests.[13]

However, as this statement implies, the long-term prospects for creating new forms of regional identity and cooperation probably rest with *"the rising voice and influence of civil society and non-government organizations,"* and with their members' willingness to exercise Dirlik's *"place-based imagination."* In this regard, it is interesting to note that even some critics of the nationalistic, authoritarian character of the Asian values movement are slow to dismiss its transformative potential.[14] Even as the Japanese government, according to one critic,

12 Birch, Schirato and Srivastava believe there were racist overtones in this abrupt denunciation of Asian values, which they attribute to Western critics following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. See *Asia: Cultural Politics in the Global Age*, p. viii.

13 Tay and Estanislao, "The Relevance of ASEAN: Crisis and Change," p. 20.

potential.[14] Even as the Japanese government, according to one critic, moves to wave the banner of Asian values in a bid to re-establish its leadership in the region,[15] groups of citizens in Japan and elsewhere are taking a variety of initiatives to challenge their government's statist agendas.[16] In many cases, they have sought to minimize cooptation by the state by working through non-governmental organizations or through local governmental bodies to engage directly with their counterparts abroad in a variety of cultural, educational, and economic exchanges. Since these initiatives will be discussed by other participants in the Rikkyo symposium, I would like to devote the remainder of my remarks to a discussion of the relationship between regionalism and education in the Asia-Pacific.

Studies of education in the modern era customarily treat it as tool for nation building. On one hand, schools provide the members of a society with the practical knowledge and skills—literacy and numeracy—required of a modern workforce. On the other hand, schools are said to play an integral role in creating what Benedict Anderson calls an "imagined community," through the formation and dissemination of a common national identity and a shared national consciousness where none existed before.[17] Following the precedent set by the Meiji government in Japan, which pioneered the introduction of universal, compulsory education in Asia, state governments have not merely promoted schooling, but have sought to define the aims and content of school education according to a national economic, political and social agenda.

The question is whether, in response to globalization, education

14 Chua, p. 151; Dirlik, p. 52.

15 Koichi Iwabuchi, *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002), pp. 13-14.

16 Zhang, p. 147; Chua, pp. 145-148.

17 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983, 1991). See also: Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991).

in Asia can be liberated from its exclusive focus on the nation to incorporate a truly regional—and global—perspective into the curriculum (both formal and informal)? Can schools be enlisted in the task of fostering a regional identity and sense of community, rather than strictly a national one? Can "education for sustainable development" assume a prominent, valued place in their curriculum? A brief look at educational reform efforts in Japan finds that while the potential is very real, so are the challenges.

In Japan, efforts to incorporate a regional perspective in the curriculum have been part of a larger official campaign to "internationalize" the school curriculum that dates back to the mid-1980s. To this end, the Ministry of Education has played a vigorous role by periodically revising the national curriculum guidelines that everyone from textbook writers and publishers to school officials and teachers are expected to adhere to. The advantage of this approach is that it sets minimum standards for curriculum reform for school districts throughout the country. The disadvantage is that it risks perpetuating elite, bureaucratic interference in education at the local level. Fortunately, such interference has itself been recognized as a deeply ingrained problem in Japanese education, prompting concurrent efforts to grant local school districts more flexibility in how they implement the standard curriculum guidelines. To cite one example: many prefectures have established new programs in international studies, some of which are housed in new international high schools, that offer students concentrated foreign language study in assorted Asian and Western languages (English, German, Chinese, Korean)—often taught with the help of native speakers—more intensive study of world history and foreign cultures, and opportunities to travel abroad in school-sponsored trips to destinations in both Asia and North America. The biggest obstacle to the success of these programs continues to be the Japan's much-criticized entrance exam system, which continues to favor rote memorization of empirical information over social education, practical experience and personal reflection.

Southeast Asian Identity and Community: By Whose Definition?

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Introduction

First and foremost, I would like to thank the organizers of this international symposium for inviting me to attend this conference, and a very special word of thanks to Mark Lincicome for inviting me to participate in this panel. When I was asked to speak in this panel, I was given to understand that my task is to present a Southeast Asian perspective on the prospects for a common identity and community in the region. Therefore, I have entitled my presentation: "Southeast Asian Identity and Community: By Whose Definition?"

To help me to frame my talk this afternoon, I am using two very useful concepts from the literature on identity formation. According to Shamsul (1996), a fellow countryman of mine, identity formation takes place within two social reality context: first, the "authority-defined" social reality and second is the "everyday-defined" social reality. The authority-defined social reality is the one which is authoritatively defined by people who are part of the dominant power structure, whereas the everyday defined social reality is the one which is experienced by the people in the course of their everyday life. These two social realities exist side by side at any given time.

Although very closely linked and constantly influencing and shaping each other, they may or may not be identical.

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I am going to use these two concepts to analyze the Southeast Asian identity and community that have been observed and interpreted by researchers, scholars, writers and social analysts, as well as my own personal narrative as someone who have daily experienced the social reality in my country and region. Before I venture into my analysis, I wish to clarify that the authority-defined context would include the debate and discourse which have taken place, in the past and at present, within the government, and between government and non-government collectives, amongst the members of the intelligentsia and within the sphere of realpolitik. As for the everyday-defined context, the discourse is usually disparate, fragmented and intensely personal and maybe considered as "*subjective*" or "*voices from below*".

National identities

A very obvious authority-defined identity is the national identity. It can be said that every nation-state in Southeast Asia is very concerned about national unity and national identity and this is particularly so in multiethnic countries like Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Indonesia. Therefore, it is imperative that citizenship education in the formal school system emphasizes patriotism, shared common values, religious tolerance and civic-mindedness as well as national ideologies. Malaysia has her *Rukunegara*, Indonesia has her *Pancasilla*, and Singapore has her "Thinking Schools and Learning Nation"(Gopinathan, 2001).

However, despite the nation-states' effort to promote national unity and identity there is always opposition to this authority-defined national identity. Not only is there a contestation of identities among people of the same nation-state, but education is also often a "contested terrain". In Malaysia, the ethnic identities among the Chinese and Indians are still very strong and they have established their own Chinese and Tamil schools to maintain their ethnic cultures. The reassertion of local identities is very prevalent in this region in spite of all the global forces acting to make people come together. Sometimes this kind of resurgence can take the form of separatist, militant move-

ments such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia.

Regional communities

Another authority-defined social reality is the existence of inter-governmental organizations such as The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (or ASEAN) which was established in 1967 and as the name implies, it is a community of nations in South East Asia. The fundamental goal of the Association is to promote cooperative peace and shared prosperity in the region. Today ASEAN has 10 member countries and it deals with transnational issues like environment, transboundary haze, transnational crime and terrorism, immigration, and drugs. The recent SARS epidemic in the region saw the cooperation of the various Health and Transport Ministries in the affected ASEAN countries working together to eliminate this epidemic. As pointed out by Ulrich Beck (1992) in his famous book *The Risk Society*, environmental risks and health hazards transcend national boundaries.

Another inter-governmental organization is the Southeast Asian Minister of Education Organization (SEAMEO) which was established in 1965 as a chartered international organization whose purpose is to promote cooperation in education, science and culture in the region. Over the years, SEAMEO has developed 12 regional educational centers which provide programmes in training, research and development, information dissemination and policies analysis in areas of specialization such as the Regional Centre for Education in Science and Mathematics (RECSAM) in Malaysia, the Regional Language Centre (RELC) in Singapore, and the Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development (RIHED) in Thailand. These regional centres are examples of an authority-defined regional community working together to improve the formal education systems in each of the member countries.

Beyond the Southeast Asian region, there is yet another bigger regional cooperation which is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

(APEC) which is a regional forum for promoting open trade and practical economic cooperation among 21 economies in the Asia-Pacific region. Putting this in layman's term, this is a "rich-man's club" comprising of the business elites operating in a borderless global economy. These business elites can be loosely described as the global tribes which jet set from one global city to another clinching business deals one after another. The development of this form of transnationalism or cosmopolitanism has led to some social commentators into arguing that, for better or for worse, this 'privileged class' would be more detached about their own national identities and regard themselves as "world citizens" (Lasch, 1995; Beck, 1998).

Besides these inter-governmental organizations, there is another set of global citizens with a common interest to solve global problems. These are the international non-government organizations (INGOs) which are usually associated with global social movements like green movement, women movement, human rights movement, workers' movement, peace movement, religious movement and many other kinds of movements. These social movements cooperate transnationally in the pursuit of worldwide goals. For examples, the green movement has the global mission of saving the planet from environmental deterioration; the women movement fights for women's rights, and the human rights movement struggle for justice and freedom. With the help of advanced communication technology, all these social movements form global alliances of some sort thus creating a sense of common identity. Many of these social movements also work consistently at raising the consciousness of ordinary citizens about their cause. Much of these education and re-education activities are done through public campaigns championing the interests of disadvantaged groups, through different forms of protests, through all types of reach-out programmes, and also through alternative publications.

Among the globalising religious movements is the resurgence of Islam which has brought about drastic consequences in the international world order. In Southeast Asia, there are many faces of Islam ranging from moderate to extremist, militant Islam. To many South-

east Asian Muslims, Islam is a political force to fight for social justice and a share of the economic pie. Some influential Islamic organizations have lost faith on their own governments to deliver the developmental goods and so they took militant actions in order to have their voices heard like the recent spree of kidnappings by the Abu Sayab group in Southern Philippines. The Islamic movement is a force to be reckoned with especially after the Bali bombings by the regional militant group Jemaah Islamiyah. A recent news report in Bangkok reported that a terror suspect linked to the Jemaah Islamiyah confessed to plotting to bomb embassies in the Thai capital during the upcoming APEC forum in October. From these reported events, we can see that political Islam has taken advantage of the heightened religious consciousness among the Muslims in this region.

What I have presented so far is what I consider as authority-defined national identities and regional communities both at the governmental and non-governmental levels in Southeast Asia. Now I would like to present my own personal narrative to give you a sense of what the everyday life is like in this region.

Personal narrative

I am a Malaysian of ethnic Chinese origin. Coming from a multi-ethnic society I can speak several languages, Chinese, English and Malay. But because I was English-educated right from young (a colonial legacy), I can't read or write the Chinese language. In many ways, I am quite different from the Chinese in Taiwan and China because I have quite lost my mother tongue. I belong to the Chinese diaspora spread throughout the world who can still enjoy a Chinese movie that is beamed into my sitting room via satellite TV from Hong Kong.

In my country, I am considered as a non-Malay and therefore I am not entitled to all the "special privileges" which are given to the Malays, and such privileges include getting promoted in the university that I am working in or in obtaining government contracts if I were to engage myself in business. I have to work doubly hard in order to gain the

same recognition as my Malay colleagues. However, this does not bother me too much because as an academician I am connected with the international academic community where I draw my inspiration, sustenance and recognition. My area of specialization is comparative education and my research interest is higher education, and so I am involved with educational research organizations in Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, S. Korea, Australia, UK and USA.

I am a woman and I am single, so my lived experiences would be very different from those of a married woman who may have to play the role of a wife and a mother and take on the double-day job if she is holding a job outside her home. My lived experiences would also be quite different from an Indian woman who is a taper in a rubber estate in Malaysia or an Indonesian maid working in a Malaysian household.

I belong to a social reform movement called ALIRAN which is a non-government organization dedicated to justice, freedom and solidarity. In this organization, I work with other members in fostering social awareness about the essence of multi-ethnic harmony, the importance of human rights and democratic principles, and the significance of public integrity in the development of a nation. As an individual, I observe the daily deterioration of the haze condition brought about by open burning in Indonesia at this time of the year although the Malaysian government has stopped announcing the Air Pollution Index for fear of scaring away the tourists. This year the tourists have really stayed away because of the SARS scare. I still fear that I may contact SARS even though the Malaysian government has declared Malaysia as free from SARS. On my part, I am very aware of the degradation of the environment around me and I am doing my best to change my lifestyle so that I do not waste and I try to use environmental friendly products. I try to practice recycling but unfortunately there is no recycling facility at my place of residence.

Coming from the tropics I like spicy food and I like to wear bright colour clothes. However, I also like sushi and sashimi, tomyam and somtam, pizza and spaghetti, beefsteak and lamb chop. I enjoy Thai massage and Chinese reflexology. I am a movie buff and I like to watch

international films from different countries. Throughout my life journey, I have acquired a very diverse taste for food and pleasure.

Concluding remarks

My life journey and life politics is only an example of the 500 million lived experiences in the Southeast Asian region. In describing myself to you, you can see that I have multiple identities. Some of these identities are based on the classic institutions of state, class, nuclear family and ethnic group. Besides these authority-defined categories, I am also trying to seek to shape my own life while redefining the world around me. In exercising reflexivity, I try to empower myself and at the same time empower others.

As an individual, I am embedded in my society and the territorial space of where I come from. Besides living in a risk society, I am also living in a "network society" (Castells 1996). I am interconnected with people from my own locality, country and region. I am also closely associated with my colleagues in other universities and my comrades in other social reform groups. In this era of globalization, I like to think of myself as a global citizen who acts locally but think globally.

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Global Issues and the Formation of Regional Identity:
A Case of Japanese NGOs

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Since the 1990's, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation (OECD), an agency of the United Nations, expressed new ideas such as "sustainable development", "participatory development", "social development", "human security" and "millennium development goals", which have promoted citizens groups and NGOs to reexamine previous approaches to economic development and to seek alternatives. These NGOs are concerned with global issues such as poverty alleviation, protection of human rights, extension of women's rights, conservation of the environment, debt cancellation, fair trade, equality of opportunity for education, promotion of health and sanitation, protection against the expansion of HIV/AIDS, provision of safe water, and banning of landmines. They also attempt to solve global issues. As a result of their activities, it is believed that NGOs contribute to the formation of global citizenship consciousness to tackle global issues.

This report will examine how to realize the formation of global citizenship consciousness by tackling global issues in the Asia-Pacific Region. It will concentrate on case studies of Japanese NGO activities in this region.

The report is divided into 4 sections: (1) the formation of regional identity and Asia-Pacific symbiotic society, (2) Asia-Pacific sym-

biosis and Japanese NGOs, (3) the role of Japanese NGOs in the formation of Asia-Pacific citizenship consciousness, (4) agendas for Japanese NGOs to achieve Asia-Pacific symbiosis.

Formation of regional identity and an Asia-Pacific symbiotic society

1) **Global citizenship consciousness and the Asia-Pacific citizenship consciousness:** In consequence of economic globalization in the Asian-Pacific region, global citizenship consciousness and the Asia-Pacific citizenship consciousness will expand to eliminate poverty and the gap between rich and poor people, stop environmental destruction, and protect human rights.

2) **The concept of the Asia-Pacific symbiotic society:** Asia-Pacific citizens and NGOs look forward to the realization of "*Asia-Pacific symbiosis*," which is a new vision and possibility aimed at a fair and equitable world through endogenous development in the Asia-Pacific society locally.

Asia-Pacific symbiotic society and Japanese NGOs

1) **Asia-Pacific NGOs and Japanese NGOs:** Local NGOs and Japanese NGOs are increasing remarkably in the Asian and the Pacific countries.Through the rapid advance of economic globalization in the Asia-Pacific region, Asia-Pacific local NGOs and Japanese NGOs are working actively to support and assist the poor and marginalized people.

2) **Japanese NGOs and the Asia-Pacific Symbiotic Society:** Asia-Pacific and Japanese NGOs are promoting a grassroots movement for the Asia-Pacific symbiotic society through partnership and sharing that reaches beyond the relationship between donors and recipients aiming to build a fair society that is free of poverty and discrimination in the Asia-Pacific region.

The role of Japanese NGOs in the formation of Asia-Pacific citizenship consciousness

1) Supporter for independence and self-reliance of Asia-Pacific peoples: Japanese NGOs are providing direct and indirect assistance in areas such as support for independence and self-reliance of Asia-Pacific peoples in order to increase their participatory consciousness and bolster their empowerment in cooperation with Asia-Pacific local NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs).

2) Collaborator in Asia-Pacific nature and environmental conservation: To prevent environmental destruction, Japanese NGOs support symbiosis for Asia-Pacific nature and environmental conservation through harmonization between Asia-Pacific people's livelihood and the environment.

3) Promoter of Asia-Pacific traditional resources and appropriate technology: Japanese NGOs are aiming at self-reliance, income generation, environmental conservation and fair trade among Asia-Pacific peoples through promotion of Asia-Pacific traditional resources and appropriate technology.

Adovocate/campaigner for solving Asia-Pacific Issues

Japanese NGOs advocate policies and lobby governments in advanced countries (including Japan), the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and transnational corporations for issues such as poverty alleviation, protection of human rights, extension of women's rights, conservation of the environment, debt cancellation, fair trade, equality of opportunity for education, provision of health and sanitation, protection against the expansion of HIV/AIDS, provision of safe water, banning of landmines, and respect for the position of the Asia-Pacific poor and weak people.

Educator for sustainable development on Asia-Pacific issues

Japanese NGOs work on education for sustainable development in Japan. They promote education to better understanding of Asia-Pacific issues, and participate in activities for making a fair Asia-Pacific symbiotic society. They also make approaches to the public and to schools in order to promote teaching materials and organize seminars and meetings to introduce these ideas into the school curriculum.

Conclusion

Agendas for Japanese NGOs relating to the realization of an Asia-Pacific symbiotic society.

1) The need for a philosophy for an Asia-Pacific symbiotic society

2) Network and partnership between the Asia-Pacific and Japanese NGOs

3) Promotion of education for sustainable development between the Asia-Pacific and Japanese NGOs.

Prospects for Regional Identity and Transnational Civil Society in Northeast Asia

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Introduction

In the world today, globalization, regionalization and localization are phenomena which have rarefied such attributes as national border consciousness and state sovereignty. After the end of the Cold War, regional exchanges between locals beyond national borders have occurred in Europe. Exchanges in peripheral regions have been called Euroregion INTERREG, and have been formed as sub-regions in the European Union (EU). In Asia, such zones as the Japan Sea Rim Economic Zone, the South China Economic Zone, and the Yellow Sea Rim Economic Zone have been created as sub-regions in East Asia. Such organizations can also be called regionalism. Regionalism can be categorized into three different classifications. The extensive Asia-Pacific area can be called *mega-region*; EU, ASEAN and NAFTA can be called *region*; then regional economic zone should be called *sub-region*.

In this presentation, I would like to focus on regionalism in Northeast Asia, and introduce "The Japan Sea Rim Exchange Movement." This movement has been created from the activities of local governments, economic organizations, universities, think tanks, NGOs, NPOs, etc. since 1990s. In this region, a common identity which raise local consciousness beyond national border is considered. I am observing

that the purpose of this regionalism is to examine the possibility of attaining a trans-national civil society in this region. I would like to consider a future view of a multicultural community that can be a model for other regions in the Asia-Pacific.

Features of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia

Northeast Asia contains six nations: the Russia Far East, three northeastern provinces of China, South Korea, North Korea, Mongolia and Japan. The total population of these roughly defined areas is approximately 310 million people. Constitutional units which are focused on in this region are not states, but rather local governments, cities, local bodies, etc. Representative from this area can present a transnational regional order produced from the assembly of grassroots exchange and cooperation. In other words, the regional order would be formed by endogenous activities, while intergovernmental economic cooperation and security would be formed by deliberations among nations.

In fact, "The Japan Sea Rim Exchange Movement" has been impelled by some expectations which started future-oriented consciousness as follows; (1) expectation for establishment of self-renewal from the frontier consciousness which local residents have, (2) expectation for exchange between local governments beyond borders, (3) expectation for the participation of international activities for small and medium-sized companies, (4) expectation to the future of the region as a new sphere of life, (5) attention to the region as one eco-system. The features of the regional exchange and cooperation are as follows. (1) There is no administrative organization among nations and the non-state elements are strong. (2) It is also a regional economic zone. (3) Multi-layer actors, such as local governments, think tanks, companies, etc. can participate.

Northeast Asia as multicultural convivial society

The movement that began from the Japan Sea coastal side of Japan, such as Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Tottori, Akita and Yamagata,

has been concerned even with the formation of cooperation of a larger Northeast Asia. Recently, a future-oriented grand design of a multicultural and multi-ethnic community design and a regional integration theory have become popular topics as found in the books such as 1) *A Grand Design of Northeast Asia*, written by Northeast Asia Grand Design Study Group, 2003; (2) *A Common House of Northeast Asia*, written by Kang Sang-Jung, 2001; (3) *East Asia Community*, written by Michio Morishima, 2001and (4) *East Asia Economic Community*, written by Japan International Forum, 2003.

A Northeast Asia Grand Design tries to find out mutual complementary relations in the diversity and socio-economic differences in the region. It takes up energy supply and environment problem as subjects which are addressed at the present. It also conceives an idea of cooperative security formed by a confidence building and cooperation between states in this region. Peaceful reconciliation and coexistence of the Korean Peninsula are required for realization of the multicultural symbiosis in the region. It is important to conquer the emotional problem related to the recognition of history among the Japanese, the Chinese and the Koreans. Professor Kang Sang-Jung advocates the Common House of Northeast Asia which is based on the principal axis as relations between Japan and South Korea. He proposes the joint control system for labor transfer between two countries and advancing the compatibility of units among Japan-South Korea universities. It is because a cultural understanding and people's exchange are indispensable to multicultural symbiosis.

Nowadays, 2.3 million Japanese people per year visit South Korea, and 1.3 million South Koreans have visited Japan. That means that 6400 Japanese have visited South Korea from twenty-two airports of the whole country everyday. Japanese people are the most foreign visitor for South Korea. A historical negative inheritance is between Japan and South Korea, and friction often occurs between governments. However peoples and economical exchange are increasing as if it conquered them. Professor Michio Morishima proposes the East Asia Community (EAC). The regional integration of East Asia can be

formed from an economic community (Gesellschaft) at first, and by an increase in half brooding and the rise of common consciousness, multicultural community (Gemeinschaft) would be created. Moreover, it is explained that the East Asian Union (EAU) can be formed after that. It becomes one of the hints of formation in terms of multicultural community and transnational civil society on a long-term view.

In Europe, people are required for the common consciousness and identity as *European citizens*. I think we have to recollect that today's EU has also started from the economic integration at the beginning. The Japan International Forum has announced the Economic Community of East Asia (ECEA) which can be established by ten nations of ASEAN, Japan, China, South Korea, and Singapore. The Forum has advocated setting the target year of 2025 to issue a single currency.

Conclusion and prospects

International relations of the Northeast Asian region seem to be traditional, because 'the conclusion of the Cold War' is not perfect and the confidence building on security is not made. The foreign policy in each country shows us the deadlock. As I mentioned, however, people's exchange and multi-layer cooperation have been formed endogenously. To conclude my brief paper, I would like to present some prospects for the 21st century in this region.

The multicultural convivial society in the region would be formed in order of endogenous/multi-layer exchange; regional cooperation; the rise of regional consciousness and regional community.

In order to deepen multicultural understanding in this region and to raise common citizen consciousness, it is necessary to reorgnize and study history mutually. I propose that the standard textbook of history in each country should be translated into the language of other countries so that these textbooks can be used in each school.

For solution of problems in the region, we need more the so-called "TRACK 2" discussion, in which international organizations, local governments, universities, think tanks and NGO/NPOs are expected to play important roles.

Low-politics activities in various fields will contribute to the stability and development in the region. This will, moreover, serve the security purpose and act as preventive diplomacy in a large meaning. Such practice in the region can serve as a model also for sub-regions in the Asia-Pacific region.

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East Asia: As a Nuclear Region

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Introduction

Generally speaking, the regional identity could be envisaged or constructed by two perspectives. One is from the 'center' and another is from the 'periphery'. In this report, I would like to think of the region of 'East Asia' from 'Niigata' that is typical countryside of Japan. The area is sometimes called 'Ura-Nihon' which means very backyard of the country. I think it is fruitful to examine the region not only from Tokyo but also from such a peripheral local area, because in doing so, we will be able to make clear the gap between these two perspectives.

In addition, as a matter of fact, my university (Niigata University of International and Information Studies) that just celebrated the 10th anniversary of the founding last month is established for the new sub-regional identity of the region, based on so-called 'Kan-Nihonkai' plan. It invited many instructors from Russia, China, Korea, and US in order to educate and produce the students who will be able to contribute to the new regional community in the future. I hope my educational experience of the university could have some meanings for this session.

In this report, I would like to illustrate the reality, both limits and possibilities, of the new regional community through investigating of the nuclear problems in the region. Although my argument sometimes sounds very pessimistic, I believe we have to face hard

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reality in order to reach the ideal situation, something like 'community/identity beyond borders' in the future. Plus, too many cases about nuclear problems in the region will be tediously illustrated in the report. But I think these are very crucial references when we think of the symposium theme, 'Sustainable Development', 'Regional Identity', and 'global citizen' in the region.

First of all, I would like to reexamine the 'globalization' as a political consequence before investigating the nuclear politics in the region.

Globalization as a political consequence

Firstly, 'globalization' is most favorable to the strong, to those who have large power resources in the capitalist system. Alongside the emerging global business, trade and information flows, a 'localizing' space-fixing process is set in motion. In other words, 'globalization' promotes the process of 'polarization' (Bauman 1998), 'ghettoization' (Hobsbawm 1995), and 'global apartheid' (Richmond 1994) with a loss of substantial communication throughout most of the world. These arguments could be synthesized into the concept of "global totalitarianism" by analyzing the system of warfare and its victims (Sasaki, 2000b). What is significant is that these processes are not like a natural disaster, but are intentionally created and underpinned by influential industrial capital and powerful states.

Secondly, 'globalization' brings about a "global risk society". This term was invented by Ulrich Beck (1986) who was perhaps the first person to regard the Chernobyl accident as the starting point for thinking of 'globalization'. He considers the reactor disaster to be one of the key experiences that characterize our new age, and he argues that the institutions of industrial society and their claims of control and security are being refuted by the "global risk society". In a "risk society", according to Beck (1986), political control over scientific technology is structurally weakened by industrial and 'non-political' activities—a term he calls "sub-politics". The existing political-administrative system no longer continues to be the center of political activity. The

influence of "sub-politics" goes beyond borders and sometimes causes borderless, uncontrollable unrest or catastrophe (called the "globalization of side-effects"). This dynamic is more or less undermining the legitimacy of existing political power.

Thirdly, in connection with the second characteristic, a further political consequence of 'globalization' is the 'multi-stratification' of the political arena (Sasaki, 1998). The nation state, which has historical authority and power, will never disappear so easily. On the other hand, many states are in the process of transformation: changing their strategy, their very nature, to adapt to the new political environment (cf. McGrew, 1997). 'Globalization' unquestionably acts on all political levels—the individual, local, national, regional and international—as well as many new political subdivisions. States have been shaken and transformed by the claims of 'decentralization' from below and 'internationalization (globalization)' from above. In addition, 'civil society' has already lost its clear definition and sometimes splits into more than two sections, in terms of the meaning of the word 'citizen(-ship)'. 'Globalization' creates political fronts and limits the ambiguous, multiple and plural. Thus, 'globalization' also opens the possibility for individuals to participate in public affairs and even to be involved in the crucial decision-making processes that may determine the fate of the world. The 'industrial society' was joined with "simple modernity" just as "risk society" is now involved in a new stage of modernity "reflexive modernity".

The meaning of 'atom-politics'

Robert Jungk (1977), an eminent German journalist, once indicated that the harnessing of atomic energy for 'peaceful' purposes is directly linked to the military usage of plutonium, and, especially, with the government's antagonism against the residents and people of it's own country under the pretext of the 'safety' of its installations. He uses the term "Atom-Staat" ('Atom State') to express the authoritarian and anti-democratic regimes produced by the combination of nuclear industries and government (Jungk, 1977).

Following the example of Jungk (1977), I would like to introduce the term "Atom-Politics", which is defined as the cross-border political phenomenon in which power is derived not only from the possession of nuclear weaponry, but also from the generation of electricity by nuclear power. The implication is that "Atom-Politics" must encompass all of the political consequences stemming from the development and utilization of atomic energy. When seen from this comprehensive standpoint, we can grasp the relationship between scientific technology and political power. This term also suggests that greater insight can be gained into the political dynamics and processes of globalization taking place, especially in East Asia.

For instance, in Japan up to the present, the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been commonly discussed only in the context of historical suffering caused by atomic bombs. However, contemporary problems from nuclear technology have hardly been mentioned. In Japanese, the word *genshiryoku*, or 'nuclear energy', is usually applied to the 'civil use' of nuclear energy, but never to its 'military use', while the English term may imply both. The term "Atom-Politics", therefore, may aid in the understanding of the potential 'duality' involved in nuclear technology.

In fact, from a historical viewpoint, the 'peaceful' use of atomic energy was originally a spin-off from the military use of nuclear power. The turning point was the public announcement of President Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' program in 1953. His message appealed to developing countries seeking a level of technological independence, as well as to technically developed countries whose military-based nuclear complexes were searching for a peaceful nuclear mission and a market for their inventions. To date the 'military use' and the 'civil use' of nuclear energy have been mutually interdependent and repeatedly rise and fall together over time (Yoshioka, 1999).

Political systems based on the utilization of applied science are apt to be highly centralized and oppressive—especially to the disenfranchised. "Atom-Politics" emerges first from anti-democratic and

controlled societies. The risk that follows the development and utilization of atomic energy is always intentionally hidden from the citizens' eyes through the feigned priority given to technological and economic exploitation. Yet, once accidents take place, we find that the risk is unequally distributed, meaning that governments refuse to take responsibilities for unforeseen damages that come to light, and the politically weak are marginalized in the process. The nuclear power complex regularly disregards the *voice of the voiceless* until actual accidents or damages become public knowledge.

"Atom-Politics", therefore, includes the study of the condition between the "people's security" and national interests (national security), and between democracy and the politics of exploitation.

Global regime formation and 'atom-politics' in East Asia

Historically, we can assume the tow faces of 'East Asia'. One is pre-modern history of the trade-commerce-based spontaneous, autonomic region, and another is modern history of the development (exploitation)-based top down regional formation. Needless to say, nuclear regime in East Asia involves in the latter.

Nuclear power has long been promoted in the west as an inexhaustible supply of energy, a history which is being repeated in East Asia. But, this time the pace and coerciveness of the introduction of nuclear energy is far more prominent than compared to the western experience. A primary impetus for the shift to nuclear energy has been the rapid economic and energy growth experienced by the region. The intense development of technology in this region can be explained both as the result of each nation's desire to create technological competency, and a shared perception that the technology represents the most economical response to the energy demands stimulated by economic growth. Presently East Asia is rapidly becoming the world's largest producer of nuclear-generated electrical energy (Kim and Byrne, 1996).

The 'Atomic Regime' formed for both the exploitation and utilization of nuclear power is essentially a global phenomenon. It is not the sum of all countries' atomic regimes, but a further integrated global system. Of course, the countries of East Asia display a great diversity of social and political forms. Yet, despite the great diversity of their regimes, countries in this region have created remarkably similar nuclear technocracies. After the Eisenhower announcement, in the context of a global political economy which promoted nuclear technology, the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) offered basic nuclear technological know-how to Japan and South Korea. This eventually led to the formation of the first corporations of domestic nuclear scientists and experts in the 1950s.

During the Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s, the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States intensified. Also during the same period, the civil use of nuclear power was promoted, institutionalized and made rapid advances around the world. In the early 1960s, General Electric (GE) developed the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) and created a market. Another corporation, Westinghouse (WH), soon followed with even larger reactors. This brought about a global 'water reactor boom' in the mid-1960s, and enabled nuclear power generation to become an independent industry. These companies' activities served as the conduit for nuclear public relations in East Asia.

In Japan, for instance, the financial sector (*zaibatsu*) was stimulated by companies which had invested in nuclear power. Technical cooperation was established between Mitsubishi and WH, as well as between Toshiba, Hitachi and GE. Japan entered the nuclear era earlier than any other East Asian country during the 1960s and 1970s. In South Korea, like in Japan, the '*zaibatsu*' also played an important role in building an energy complex. A single public unity, the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), was organized and given the responsibility for the construction of power plans, the generation and distribution of electricity, and the planning and finance for future energy needs. In South Korea, foreign companies such as WH and Framatome were major players during the early stages.

From the onset, each domestic 'Atomic Regime' in the East Asian region was strongly influenced by international political economies and formulated into highly centralized systems that concentrated nuclear technology in the hands of a few companies and governments.

During the late 1970s and 1980s, western countries gradually reconsidered their programs for enlarging the scale of electrical generation by nuclear power. Following the nuclear test by India in 1974, the international community sought to prevent nuclear proliferation, which also involved the curtailment of nuclear trade and the transfer of Sensitive Nuclear Technology (SNT). The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 1987 also accelerated the decline of nuclear industries. Moreover, by the mid-1970s, international public opinion, which had favored nuclear power during the early 1970s, gradually became antagonistic towards nuclear technology because of safety concerns. The catastrophic accidents at Three Miles in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986 were benchmarks in the shift of public opinion. Consequently, during the late 1980s and 1990s, the US and many European countries gradually scaled back the construction of new nuclear power plants. The decision by the French to abolish the 'Super-Phoenix (SPX)' in 1998, the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995, and the 1995 Japanese Monju accident made it clear that the use of nuclear power, both civil and military, could not be maintained in the West.

However, many countries in East Asia have not given up efforts to build new nuclear power plants even after the events of the 1990s. The main reason is that the nuclear industries in developed countries including US, France, Canada, Russia, Japan, and Korea have induced the rest of the East Asian countries to continue to import nuclear power plants and materials. Because these nuclear industries could no longer depend on the domestic demand for their products, they have found a way out to export their goods on a newer, larger, and more vulnerable international market.

As many analysts suspect, China will be the most important potential new nuclear market in the twenty-first century. France, Canada,

and Russia have taken the export offensive in China and have reached a number of nuclear cooperation agreements with the Chinese. North Korea originally seems to have pursued the development of an atomic weapons system over that of supplementing the country's means for generating electricity. However, North Korea had also been seeking assistance for the construction of two pressurized-water reactors (PRW) that would be built in exchange for giving up the generation of weapons-grade plutonium in graphite-moderated reactors. Operating under US, IAEA and Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) management, South Korea and Japan should have build and financed these PRWs (Molts and Mansourov, 2000). But this KEDO project is now deadlocked because the nuclear crisis in North Korea was rekindled by alteration of the US foreign policy. Taiwan has also become a battlefield for a marketing campaign by these nuclear energy corporations. Above all, Japan has played the most important role in exporting and constructing new nuclear power plants in this region, and has sought to manipulate public opinion in its scheme to accelerate nuclear exploitation (Miyajima, 1996).

At this point, it is necessary to redefine the concept of 'East Asia'. While the concept of 'region' has various implications, from this report's point of view, 'East Asia' involves the political space produced by the industrial-political complex formed for the express purpose of exploiting and utilizing atomic energy. If worst comes to worst, all nations share a common destiny in terms of suffering from not only nuclear accidents but also the chain reaction of nuclear militarization in this region. To put it succinctly, 'East Asia' is a 'Nuclear Region'.

'Atomic Regimes' as the denial of democracy

As previously mentioned, each 'Atomic Regime' in East Asia has pursued a similar path of development in creating a commercial nuclear power complex. Upon achieving this, each regime then steadily established centralized forms of energy control, and a nuclear regime arose either for the purpose of powering commerce or for military strength. In the process of either of these developments, the control of

large-scale technologies, such as the creation of nuclear reactors or the planning of comprehensive nuclear power programs, led each 'Atomic Regime' to become an autocratic system.

Generally, in East Asia, the promotion of nuclear development has been strongly linked to dictatorial and highly centralized governments. While North Korea would be the first country to spring to mind, Paul R. Josephson has noted that Russia's nuclear power program from Stalin to the present can be regarded as "atomic powered communism"(Josephson, 2000). The Chernobyl catastrophe has become the crucial icon of the bankruptcy of Soviet political leadership as well as symbolizing the failure of Soviet nuclear program itself. In South Korea, the Pak Chong-hui Administration once intended to develop nuclear weapons in 1970s. Both the Chon Du-hwan and No Tae-u Administration were involved in bribes from foreign nuclear companies. These so-called "authoritarian regimes" promoted the development of nuclear industries in South Korea. In addition, in Taiwan, Jiang Jie-shi was secretly committed to the development of nuclear weapons in an arms race with mainland China, especially after the mainlanders announced their first successful nuclear test in 1964. Taiwan currently operates six reactors. Moreover, all were built without any systematic opposition, because martial law had been in effect since 1949. An electric power company in Taiwan is still the only state-owned "Taiwan Electric Power Company", and has exclusive control over the Taiwanese Atomic Energy Commission.

Furthermore, an 'Atomic Regime' by necessity produces center-periphery relationships within its borders. Nuclear power plants are usually constructed not in the urban areas, but in the provinces where the government can easily buy pieces of land and where people lack the power to object to state policies. As a result, the risks and costs of electric power production are always forced on the peripheral regions in order to supply the fruits to the center. This system of inequality is found not only in the problems surrounding nuclear power plants, but also in the problems of military bases, because national security is sometimes preserved at the sacrifice of the residents around the

base, as can be observed numerous crimes committed by American service personnel in Japanese Okinawa. In such cases, however, the voice of the minorities is typically ignored. An example of this can be observed in the problem of radioactive waste disposal. For instance, in Taiwan, over sixty percent of nuclear waste is kept on a very small island, Lan-Yu Dao , in which the aboriginal Yami tribe have lived for centuries. Therefore, in a sense, the problem of nuclear politics is sometimes linked to the problems of ethnic minorities throughout the world. We can witness similar incidents occurring in Russia and China.

Indications of domestic opposition and a border-less solidarity

As mentioned above, the meaning of "Atom-Politics" includes not only the international politics of oppression, but also the generation of anti-nuclear politics by the people. In South Korea, the full-scale anti-nuclear movement started in the late 1980s as the totalitarian regime gradually lost its power. Transition to more democratic rule has also accompanied a critical analysis of the past military governments and their politics. This has included an examination of their commitments to nuclear development. In 1990, strong local resistance in Ahn-Myun Do broke out against the government's attempt to place a spent fuel interim storage site on the small island. After this incident, the South Korean government faced bold and unyielding protests against any proposed generating and waste disposal site.

In Taiwan, after lifting the martial law in 1987, a number of green non-governmental organizations were formed. These groups cooperated with each other and organized a nationwide anti-nuclear movement. The Taiwan Environment Protection Union (TEPU), which was established in 1987, played a central role in forming the network of resistance. At the same time, a new leader of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Chen Shui-bian pledged to put an end to construct new nuclear power plants and, as a result, won the presidential election in 2000. The social problems accompanied by nuclear power generation have become a crucial issue for the process of democratization in Tai-

wan. Although it was decided later that the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant (which was essentially 'made in Japan') would be continued as a result of the DPP's compromise with the National Party (KMT), it is believed that the Bush Administration's declaration to change nuclear policy in US had some influence on the outcome of this decision. At any rate, it seems that Taiwan has taken its first step towards becoming a 'non-nuclear nation'.

As mentioned earlier, since the formation and function of the nuclear complex is essentially global, the anti-nuclear movement should seek to create international cooperation as well. Indeed, through the 1990s, a global network to protest against nuclear regimes and to support the creation of a non-nuclear society was realized. For example, the movement of "Abolition 2000" was established by numerous NGOs in 1995 and gave impetus to the 'Middle Power Initiative' in 1998 (Green, 1999). These activities, which were supported by an empowered civil society, not only stand firm against the might of nuclear regimes, but also have the ability to formulate plans and make proposals within the existing political order. It is hoped that these developments will stand as promising examples for the creation of a 'Nuclear-free Zone in East Asia'.

Each movement that has developed has gradually improved its cooperative relations with others beyond its national borders. An instance of this was when the Kansai Electric Power Company in Japan was forced to discontinue its use of plutonium-based mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in 1999. Mox was scheduled to be used at the Takahama nuclear power plant in Fukui Prefecture, but in this case, the fabrication of data concerning MOX was detected. This instance not only exposed contradictions in the company's plan to recycle plutonium (*Purusaamaru Plan*), but also demonstrated strong cooperative relations among people from a local antinuclear NGO with others from Greenpeace International, as well as a Korean environmental NGO. Such cooperation helped to change the policies of enterprises associated with nuclear power plants and the Japanese government which is the driving force behind the creation of nuclear power plant (Green Action, 2000).

Moreover, another noteworthy movement has been the "No Nukes Asia Forum". This movement started in 1992 and has been convened every year since in many Asian countries. The first forum was held in Japan in 1993, and the latest (the ninth) was in Korea in 2001. There are three remarkable points about this movement. First, it grapples with comprehensive problems of both military and civil uses of nuclear power. Second, it links democratic and post-nuclear movements by considering the stark realities of people working in each country. Third, it creates an international open forum for people to cooperate with each other. These significant points of contact outside the control of local authorities have created a groundswell of support for opposing the policies of the existing nuclear regimes. With a growing number of successes in changing government policies, it could be said that this phenomenon constitutes the growth of democracy on a global level.

Political movement against the nuclear power plant in Niigata

Although Niigata narrowly escaped nuclear tragedy in 1945, the residents of Niigata now suffer serious anxiety from living in the location which houses the largest nuclear power plant on the entire planet. The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant, which was constructed by the Tokyo Electric Power Company, has a maximum generating capacity of over eight million kilowatts, and can supply the equivalent of at least seventy-five percent of Tokyo's electrical energy needs.

As in other countries, nuclear power plants designed to supply major metropolitan areas with electric power were constructed in distant provinces, for example, Fukui, Fukushima, and Niigata Prefectures (Kamata, 1996), which points to the existence of a so-called domestic 'North-South problem' in Japan. There are remarkable inequities between the center and the provinces in the degree of development. Although this is a common feature among the developing countries, as many studies have already pointed out, the situation also

exists in Japan. In this structure, the development of provinces depends on the distribution of resources from the central government. The central government takes advantage of this dependency and exerts great influence over the process of development of nuclear power plants in Japan. The development process of provinces and prefectures is improved by the center, which uses the prefectures to serve its purposes and manipulates them by dangling concessions. The current approach is one where nuclear power plants are invited into a prefecture by the central government, and while financial benefits for local residents are bandied about, the construction companies and bureaucrats undertaking the task benefit in ways which are far more lucrative than other public works projects.

It is not a coincidence that one of Japan's former prime ministers, Tanaka Kakuei, who created the basic framework for 'interest politics' in Japan, is also from Niigata Prefecture. Tanaka set up not only the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy under what was then the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), but also the grant system for developing new electrical power sites (known as the dengensanpo subsidy system). Under this system, huge subsidies are guaranteed for the provinces that accept nuclear power plants. These subsidies are far higher than those for hydroelectric and thermal power plants. It was also Tanaka who invited the nuclear power plants to Kashiwazaki in Niigata.

In addition to the 'center-periphery' structure used to support the regime of nuclear development in Japan, great efforts were made to justify the development of nuclear power plants by concerned ministries and agencies. These ranged from the Atomic Energy Commission to local electric power companies, all of whom had a stake in the growth and acceptance of Japanese nuclear power. As the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission recently highlighted in their "Long-Term Plan" policy statement, Japan's lack of indigenous energy resources is generally used to justify its pursuit of a nuclear economy (Byrne and Hoffman, 1996). In Japan, nuclear power plants are regarded as a necessity, although the logic behind this assumption has never been

investigated. The only political controversy is over safety issues (Yoshioka, 2000). Moreover, implausible and, at times, outrageous statements, such as "*nuclear power plants are ecological*", have been issued as justification for the creation of more plants in recent years.

The Japanese government-industrial complex, which was formed in the process of the development of nuclear power plants soon after World War II, also created a political system which is structurally closed to the people. However, this system has fallen under attack since the Monju accident of 1995. Repeated accidents and scandals—for example, the explosive accident of the Tokai plant during the re-treatment of radioactive waste materials in 1997 and the critical accident of Tokai JCO in 1999—have created a climate of distrust and unease about governmental nuclear policies and the safety of nuclear power plants. As part of this national tide, Japanese citizens have started to reexamine the necessity of nuclear power plants in this country.

The local referendum of the Maki Township in Niigata, which was held to decide whether or not a nuclear power plant ought to be constructed, was the first case in which a prefecture publicly took issue with national administration on nuclear power plants as a national policy (Niigata-Nippo, 1997). The planning of the Maki nuclear power plant was headed by the powerful Tohoku Electric Power Company, which proposed the project as far back as 1969. From the beginning, a power struggle existed at the local political level among conservative politicians (many who supported the plan) partly because of the characteristics of the Japanese medium-sized district electoral system. That is the reason why both sides, for and against to the construction, had maintained the balance of power for a long time. Yet, as antagonism grew against the plan, the confrontation became clear, especially after Sato, a proponent of the nuclear power plan was elected town mayor three times in 1994.

Influential residents in the area, including many who were successful independent businessmen and generally considered establishment conservatives, banded together and provided the leadership

necessary to strengthen the various groups opposing the ongoing construction of the nuclear power plant. These groups first insisted on the importance of considering the will of the residents before arguing the pros and cons of the building project. They then carried out a local referendum without any legal force in 1995. As a consequence, Mayor Sato was eventually forced to resign, and a local referendum resulted in the establishment of local ordinance law in 1996. As a result of that referendum, it became clear that the majority of residents were opposed to the construction of the nuclear power plant. The new mayor, Sasaguchi, who was a representative of the movement which held the local referendum based on a local ordinance law of Maki (where the nuclear power plant was to be built), declared that property in the town would never be sold to Tohoku Electric Power Company or to the Japanese government. The result was that it became impossible to construct the plant in the Maki Township.

The policy on nuclear power plants was also reconsidered by the small village Kariwa in Niigata Prefecture, which lies about 160 miles northwest of Tokyo and has a population of 5,000. In this region people had never struggled against the landed class and had never had any resistance movement, which is rather unusual in Niigata Prefecture. This was perhaps why Tanaka Kakuei was able to construct a sphere of influence around him in the region, and why the biggest nuclear power plant in the world was constructed. However, the first local referendum concerning a plan to use recycled plutonium for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant, which was developed by the Japanese government and Tokyo Electric Power Company, was held in May 2001 in spite of resistance from the mayor of Kariwa Village, Shinada, who was a former supporter of the nuclear power plant. The result was that a majority (53.4 percent) of residents opposed the plan due to their distrust of the plant and their safety. The plebiscite was held in the wake of a series of accidents and cover-ups that had made many Japanese uneasy about nuclear power. In addition, the residents found that the grant allowing for the plant was only temporary legislation. In other words, the amount of the grant

would decrease after construction, meaning the economic benefits would only be ephemeral. As such, side effects such as corruption could develop rather easily and could potentially be harmful to the interests of the community.

What do these two local referendum in Niigata mean? (cf. Imai, 2000). In a local shed, which is the base of opposition to construction, residents have often said, *"This is the first chance for us to demonstrate our opinion."* So far, the construction of nuclear power plants has been executed, based on prior agreement, *jizen-ryokai*, basically among the national government, the heads of local government and electric power companies. They have not always reflected the *'voice of the voiceless'*, that is to say the residents. Therefore, I think it is important to consider these movements for local referendums on this matter to be a movement of "radical democracy".

A more important issue is that the actions of a small local government could have such a great influence on the whole state and the world. Taking advantage of the Maki case, the rising tide to direct democracy by means of local referendums has expanded not only to Okinawa but also throughout Japan. The attempt of the residents in Kariwa village, who regarded the residents of Maki Town as forerunners, drove the Japanese government to reconsider its policy on nuclear power plants. In fact, it is difficult to continue to execute the plan of using recycled plutonium because it must be developed on a national scale. Criticism that a local referendum is not an appropriate way for subjects concerning national policy to be discussed or decided, and that it is just the ego of the residents, has no validity anymore. After the local referendum of Kariwa Village, members of "The Society to Voice Kariwa Residents Opinions to the Government", the group which organized that referendum, immediately held a meeting in Tokyo to hold a discussion with residents in the metropolitan area. Kashiwazaki-Kariwa had been introduced as an example of a successful nuclear power plant, but, in reality, the plant's existence has been controversial. These events may have an impact on the use of nuclear power plants internationally.

Conclusion: Towards a border-less democracy in East Asia

As described above, during the 1990s the nuclear regime in East Asia has been gradually compelled to change due to the increasing influence of civil society in the region. Japanese intellectuals have believed too easily that the debate about the nuclear power problem has not attracted any interest. Yet, they have not grasped the ramifications this problem has for our future. Atom-politics has to be studied in a framework of 'democracy' and must include international and military dimensions.

Obviously, the nuclear regime that is forming and developing on a global level will, however, try to recover from such setbacks. In July 2001, researchers from five countries and regions—the US, Japan, South Korea, China, and Taiwan—have agreed in principle to take part in a joint research project on the disposal of spent nuclear fuel deep underground. In addition, nine countries, including the US, Japan, and South Korea recently came to an agreement to develop a new type of nuclear power plant cooperatively. Furthermore, despite the cover-up many scandals embroiling TEPCO, in order to propel the plan to recycle plutonium (the *Purusaamaru Plan*) and to restart its reactors to meet Tokyo's demand in Japan, the nuclear complex is about to develop new forms of public relations to acquire residents' understanding (*jumin-rikai*) throughout Japan.

However, the value of people's 'security' and 'safety', which has been neglected by nuclear administrations up to the present, constitutes a crucial political issue. Namely, nuclear policy can no longer avoid dealing with the problem of 'legitimacy'. Although recently re-kindling nuclear crisis in North Korea make Japanese people (especially in Niigata) a little bit nervous and sometimes nationalistic, little by little border-less cooperative relationships made by many kinds of civic activities will be formed, and these can bring about the plurality of politics on the local, national, and global levels in the long run. The given conditions of nuclear policy in terms of either international

politics or 'national projects' will begin to erode. The trend leads towards the possibility of a spontaneous 'border-less democracy' in the region, and in this instance, these movements against 'atom-politics' may not be far off the mark (Sasaki, 2000a).

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